The Decline of Latin American Economies: Growth, Institutions, and Crises by Gerardo della Paolera & Martín Grandes
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Decline of Latin American Economies:
Growth, Institutions, and Crises
Volume Author/Editor: Sebastian Edwards, Gerardo Esquivel
and Graciela Márquez, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-18500-1
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/edwa04-1
Conference Date: December 2-4, 2004
Publication Date: July 2007
Title: The True Measure of Country Risk: A Primer on the
Interrelations between Solvency and the Polity Structure
of Emerging Markets, Argentina 1886–1892
Author: Gerardo della Paolera, Martín Grandes
URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10656195
5.1 Introduction
This paper looks into the heterogeneous eﬀects that the process of ﬁ-
nancial integration with the world capital market had on diﬀerent govern-
ment bodies in Argentina. It covers the period from 1886 until the run-up
to the Baring Crisis in 1891.
Among the ﬁrst to analytically recognize that the nature of emerging cap-
ital markets is far more complex than the arbitrage parity conditions in the
conventional goods and services markets were Harberger (1980) and Eaton
(1985). In this essay we add an extra dimension to their analysis and ask how
credit constraints and potential defaults are to be analyzed by considering
the behavior of diﬀerent political entities within the same sovereign nation.
The asymmetric havoc wrought by the Baring collapse was reﬂected by
a credit crunch for the provinces and the municipal entities, leading them
to a default on their obligations by the end of 1891. By contrast, the Bank
of England acted as a timely lender of last resort for the national govern-
ment. Unlike other developed countries at the time, whose ﬁnancial mar-
kets at diﬀerent levels were well integrated into the world capital markets—
meaning their borrowings were regarded as perfect substitutes—the Ar-
gentina experience suggests an opposite fate.
This contribution aims to demonstrate that the public sector borrowings
at all three levels—national, provincial, and municipal—were not per-
ceived as holding the same risk class—that is, they were seen as imperfect
substitutes. Moreover, our approach suggests that an analysis of the public
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at the American University of Paris.debt dynamics should take into account the political structure of the coun-
try in question. It is always the case that, in spite of their diﬀerent political
jurisdictions, provincial and municipal debt was always recognized ex post
facto as a federal liability. Hence, we will reconsider the true measure of
country risk: political structure matters for the management and assess-
ment of public debt. The paper intends to (a) ﬁrst, set out a simple frame-
work to address the reality of the diﬀerent political entities; (b) then con-
struct the time series data of the yield to maturity of the relevant bonds and
ﬁnancial instruments with the purpose of (c) computing the true measure
of country risk, as deﬁned by the weighted average of sovereign and sub-
sovereign default risk premia.
The lessons drawn by this paper are very telling regarding the recent
build-up of debt that drove the surprising collapse of the Argentine cur-
rency board and its ﬁnancial system in early 2002. It also points out that to
analyze the dynamics of monetary and ﬁscal policies by looking only at
central government institutions is at best a partial equilibrium exercise
(della Paolera and Taylor 2003). The intertemporal eﬀects of the country’s
polity structure on economic outcomes should be taken into account to
correctly assess the risk premium of an emerging market country and the
real debt burden borne by its residents. Also, this exercise opens the ques-
tion of what it means to exercise the role of lender of last resort in the in-
ternational ﬁnancial architecture (della Paolera 2001).
5.2 The Rationale to Recalculate the Country Risk Premium
In much of the recent literature on political economy—for instance, in
Persson and Tabellini (2003)—the main issue is that economic policymak-
ing generates conﬂicts in diﬀerent dimensions and therefore, political
economy outcomes are a function of the political institutions’ structure.
These authors highlight the diﬀerent games played by the political actors
within a political system to inﬂuence political economy outcomes, but very
little is said about how the engineering of the decision-making process in a
republic can aﬀect economic outcomes, and, more importantly, the per-
ception of state solvency.1
Surprisingly enough, when it comes to analyzing the conduct of ﬁscal pol-
icy, the question of how diﬀerent political parties coalesce or not is more of-
ten studied when the so-called common-pool problem in ﬁscal policy is
addressed, rather than the issue of the political structure, delegation of
authority, and sovereign and subsovereign jurisdictions. The importance of
taking into account the political structure for the conduct of public policy is
recognized by Persson and Tabellini (2003, 38): “We are conﬁdent that fo-
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1. One crucial exception to this is Elster (1995) on the impact of constitutions on economic
performance and Drazen (2000, 134–37).cusing on central rather than general governments does not bias our infer-
ences. Nevertheless, we always include an indicator variable for federal po-
litical structures in our cross-country analysis....  T h e s e  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  control
all levels of government more easily in unitary than in federal states.”
In this vein, we want to investigate the linkages between the political
structure and the pricing and management of the public debt in a federal
republic such as Argentina for the period 1886–92. This period is fertile in
terms of access to the international capital markets, and is one that has
both good data and institutional qualitative information available. In eco-
nomic history, there are three or four candidates of newly settled federal
countries that could be outstanding laboratories for analyzing the dynam-
ics and moral hazard of public government debt under a federal constitu-
tional design: the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina.2
The importance of analyzing whether subsovereign becomes in fact a
sovereign debt liability was clearly recognized in the case of Argentina
some time ago by Marichal (1989, 162–63): “The long term consequences
of Financial Dependency: While the debt arrange of 1893 provided sub-
stantial relief for the Argentine National Treasury, the drain of capital
from Buenos Aires to Europe continued despite the large payments remit-
ted from Argentina, the foreign debt of the national government did not
decline. In fact, between 1891 and 1900 it rose from 204 million to 389 mil-
lion gold pesos. This huge increase did not come from fresh loans as such,
but rather from a series of conversions of previous debts. Speciﬁcally, the
Argentine National Government assumed responsibility for all existing
debts of the provincial governments and the municipalities.”
Also, Shepherd’s (1933, 59) paper on the default and adjustment of Ar-
gentine foreign debts states: “More than 15 years elapsed from the ﬁrst
defaults in Argentina, July 1, 1890, to the last settlement in December,
1906....   Holders of provincial and municipal bonds . . . lost all accrued
interest and suﬀered reduction of principal in most instances. It is needless
to speculate upon what the outcome of debt negotiations with individual
Provinces would have been if the National Governments had not assumed
responsibility for the provincial foreign debts.”
As we can appreciate here, the theoretical aspects of country risk, moral
hazard, and incomplete information have to take into account the political
structures of nations. At some point, in times of ﬁnancial turmoil the com-
mon-pool ﬁscal problem emerges, so the question is: what is the true coun-
terfactual (or actual) country risk measure of the state under considera-
tion? What is the true measure of the expected solvency of a sovereign state
with a complex and fuzzy federal structure?
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2. For Brazil, there is a discussion about the federal level by De Paiva Abreu (1999): “Brazil:
1824–1957: Born on Mau Pagador.” However, the author makes no account of the consoli-
dated debt.To our knowledge, to analyze the process of capital arbitrage and con-
vergence, previous estimations of interest rates in emerging countries or
newly settled economies restricted their data analysis to liquid central gov-
ernment bonds. We claim that these estimates might only show an incom-
plete picture of that process. Furthermore, we may even have to reexamine
the process of interest rate convergence of countries such as the United
States, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina once the ex ante and ex post eco-
nomic eﬀects of the subsovereign bodies (i.e., provinces and municipali-
ties) are taken into account. Roberto Cortes Conde (1989) clearly ad-
dresses the problem of the ﬁscal linkages between the federal government
of Argentina and the provinces, but his aim is not to analyze the dynamics
of debt in a consolidated fashion.3 Della Paolera (1988) and della Paolera
and Taylor (2001) analyze the dynamics of ﬁscal and monetary policy co-
ordination, though they emphasize the role of the central ﬁscal authorities.
Finally, Fishlow (1989) looks into the public debt burden for an open econ-
omy, but again, like the previous authors, mostly looks at the convergence
of interest rates of Argentina to the world economy by considering the
standard real yield spread of a sovereign bond over the world risk-free in-
terest rate. To be fair, the macroview is also present in more general stud-
ies, such as in Ferguson (2001, 142), who recognizes the problem in his sem-
inal work: “Although, the American federal government never defaulted
on its debt, the same cannot be said of the American States themselves. In
the recession of 1837–43, there were defaults on around half of the out-
standing state debts; 10 per cent of the total amount owed by the states
were repudiated altogether.”
Also, E. Cary Brown (1990, 232) states while analyzing the U.S. 1843 cri-
sis: “Unsuccessful eﬀorts were made to persuade the federal government
to assume or support these debts, and many foreign lenders clearly failed
to distinguish the two levels of government.” Also, the same author men-
tions an important economic history episode which reveals the ex ante and
ex post importance of the consequences of the political entity ﬁscal struc-
ture on the calculation of the real ex ante cost and real burden of the public
debt: “European lenders were ready purchasers of many states’ debts, but
were understandably put oﬀ by the defaults and, after, repudiations. Sec-
retary of the Treasury Bibb in his Annual Report for 1844 stated: “If aliens,
not understanding the texture of the National Government, do not distin-
guish accurately between engagements entered into by the several States
. . . have distrusted the credit of the National Government . . . such distrust
is to be regretted.”4
Another interesting case wherein a province or municipality defaulted
and was not bailed out by the national government, and where the fact that
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3. See, however, Cortes Conde (1987).
4. See E. Cary Brown (1990, 252). The United States deﬁnitely had a consolidating view of
the debt after the Civil War. Our a priori hunch here is that unitarian political regimes are less
prone to public debt recursive crises, but this is a topic for further research.the subsovereign borrower defaulted did not aﬀect, at all, the risk of other
entities and the national government, is provided by the experience of Brazil
in 1894–1904. This is the case of the state of Espiritu Santo, which defaulted
on its 1894 bond issue in 1901 and resumed payments in 1904. The default
risk of other entities was not aﬀected by the actions of this state. In fact,
Brazil was de facto on gold and capital was ﬂowing to the country. The same
state that defaulted got a new loan four years later at a good price.5
The Argentine experience is both quantitatively and theoretically com-
pelling. As della Paolera (1988, 28) states: “Revised estimates conﬁrmed
the importance of the European capital transfers to the Argentine econ-
omy: in between 1884–90 the country absorbed 11 per cent of the new port-
folio issues of the London market; North America (including Canada)
with a population twenty times that of Argentina absorbed 30 per cent of
the new issues.” In this ﬁrst draft, we attempt to construct the true measure
of country risk for Argentina for the important 1886–92 period, and then
to analyze the diﬀerences that are obtained from the standard view of Ar-
gentina’s behavior and state of aﬀairs in international capital markets. This
exercise should be seen as a ﬁrst modest attempt to open the question
about diﬀering political economic goals of diﬀerent subsovereigns within
the same country.
5.3 Analytical Framework
5.3.1 Public Debt and the True Measure of Country Risk
For the reasons sketched previously, Argentina’s true country risk pre-
mia should not be viewed as strictly equal to the premium paid by the na-
tional government during the booming years of the ﬁrst era of ﬁnancial
globalization (1880–91), when international liquidity was plentiful. Since
diﬀerent subnational entities (provincial and municipal) should have been
perceived as holding (substantially) diﬀerent risk classes compared to the
national sovereign, the calculation of country risk premium could be mis-
leading if one assumed it to be equal to such national sovereign risk. We
argue that if Argentine bonds are perceived as better risks than their
provincial and municipal counterparts, the market is implicitly recogniz-
ing that the diﬀerent political bodies run an independent ﬁscal policy.
However, the recurrent story of emerging capital markets is that when in-
ternational capital markets dry up, the sovereign body, the nation, envelops
and bails out the subsovereign bodies. Hence, the assessment of country
risk should take into account this institutional feature.
Let us call RA, RP, and RM the national, provincial, and municipal
yield, respectively, spread over a risk-free rate. We argue that the true cost
of transferring ﬁnancial resources to Argentina (RT), measured by the
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5. We thank Aldo Musacchio for bringing this episode to our attention.yield spread over a comparable risk-free bond, the British Consol yield, for
instance, would be more adequately deﬁned by the weighted sum of RA,
RP, and RM. The implicit weight is given by the share of each entity’s bor-
rowings in the total supply of loans at some time T (  A,  P, and  M):
RT    ARA    PRP    MRM
where  i   Li/LTOT with i   A, P, and M.
We calculate the  is using public borrowing ﬁgures, drawn from Shepherd
(1933), over the period 1886–91. The debt incurred by the diﬀerent political
entities had a manifold purpose: (a) expansion of the railway network or
other public works; (b) capitalization of provincial banks; (c) consolidation
of other outstanding debt; and (d) the ﬁnancing of mortgage loans, which ul-
timately encouraged land speculation. The  i are reported in table 5.1.
Marichal (1989) computes an average  i for the period 1880–90 and ob-
tains   A   0.5,  P   0.42, and  M   0.08. As these estimates reﬂect more
accurately the average debt stock share of each political entity in the total
indebtedness over the whole decade (i.e., the 1880s),6 we will use them in
section 5.4 to compute the true measure of country risk, RT, notwithstand-
ing our sample being constrained to 1886–92, as was argued earlier.
5.3.2 Supply of External Funds and Risk Premia
The uneven degree of ﬁnancial integration of the diﬀerent Argentine
governmental bodies into the international capital market becomes appar-
ent, not only through the assessment of country risk, but also through their
counterpart: the external supply of loanable funds available for those enti-
ties. That is, when international liquidity crunched the response of interest
rates or yield diﬀerentials (measured by subtracting the risky yield from a
risk-free benchmark yield) to a variation in the external supply of loanable
funds, it should have been felt as having an asymmetric impact on the
diﬀerent governmental entities.
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Table 5.1 Public borrowings, in thousands of gold pesos and percent of total loans
Year National  A Provincial  P Municipal  M Total
1886 16,128 0.39 25,459 0.61 0 0.00 41,587
1887 33,744 0.72 10,912 0.23 1,892 0.04 46,548
1888 31,750 0.35 48,810 0.53 11,200 0.12 91,760
1889 13,067 0.42 1,620 0.05 16,146 0.52 30,833
1890 11,420 1.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 11,420
1891 2,506 1.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 2,506
Average 0.65 0.24 0.11
6. Table 5.1 demonstrates that provincial and municipal entities were credit rationed in
1890 and 1891.A ﬁrst rationale of such asymmetric response may be found in the pop-
ular perception that the Bank of England would only bail out the national
government in case of ﬁnancial distress. A second plausible rationale could
be the broad tax collection privileges and export-import levy monopoly of
the national government over the subsovereign entities, and perhaps a
stronger provincial than municipal ﬁscal stance. In other words, provinces
and municipalities had less guarantees to oﬀer to foreign creditors in case
of ﬁnancial distress. A third and last rationale of the asymmetric reaction
in yield spreads of diﬀerent government bodies to a contraction in the ex-
ternal supply of loanable funds lies in transfer risk. Transfer risk (or direct
sovereign intervention risk) refers to the probability that a government
with (foreign currency) debt servicing diﬃculties imposes foreign exchange
payment restrictions (e.g., debt payment moratoria, strict capital controls)
on otherwise solvent companies and/or subsovereign entities in its juris-
diction, forcing them to default on their own foreign-currency obligations.
All this is equivalent to saying that the degree of credit rationing or the con-
ditions under which new borrowings would have been undertaken by the
national and subnational entities has to be perceived as plainly diﬀerent.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the supply of external funds each borrower faced
under the assumption of rationed credit markets—that is, the impossibil-
ity of borrowing unlimited ﬁnancial resources at a constant interest rate.
LA, LP, and LM stand for the external supply of loans faced by the Argen-
tine Republic and the provincial and municipal entities, respectively. Here
it can be seen that a tightening of the credit constraint hits ﬁrst at those
low-quality, high-risk borrowers, that is, provinces and municipalities.7
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Fig. 5.1 Supply of external funds under the assumption of rationed credit markets
7. When credit markets are not rationed, though, some municipal entities may be able to
borrow cheaper than provinces. In a database containing the time series of default risk pre-
mia for a number of subsovereign Brazilian entities over 1895–1930, Musacchio (2005)
demonstrates that for certain years—especially since 1900—the risk premium borne by the
municipality of Rio de Janeiro was lower than the spreads paid over the British Consol yields
by states such as Minas Gerais or Espirito Santo. This fact could be explained by the relatively
higher export and import revenue of Rio de Janeiro.In other words, the elasticities of their respective risk premia to the for-
eign credit supply that each borrower faced would have been diﬀerent.
Figure 5.1 replicates previous work by Harberger (1980) and Eaton
(1985) on the recognition of diﬀerent perception of risk, but is extended
to the case of various subsovereign entities. Harberger was a pioneer in
explaining why the small country/open economy assumption that those
countries face an inﬁnitely elastic supply of funds was at best, a very weak
assumption in understanding how ﬁnancial and debt markets work in
developing countries. Another important theoretical study was done by the
pioneering works of Calvo (1988) and Calvo and Guidotti (1990) on the im-
portance of expectations for interest price formation and the volatility of
maturity. Here, as a ﬁrst approximation, we deal with the true process of
debt pricing in a federal republic that has foggy linkages with its diﬀerent
subsovereign entities.
5.3.3 Sovereign and Subsovereign Risk Premia in a Simple General
Equilibrium Framework: The “Cascade” Eﬀect
For a foreign-currency denominated bond (either in British pounds or
gold), the premium over a risk-free asset (typical benchmarks at the time
were the British Consols, denominated in British pounds) borne by an
emerging market issuer can be deﬁned as follows. First, let Rt,k ∗A, Rt,k ∗P, and
Rt,k ∗M denote the annualized gross yields (i.e., one plus the interest rate) at
time t on foreign-currency debt issued on the London market by the resi-
dent emerging sovereign A (or subsovereigns P and M, respectively), with
k-period maturity; let R∗f
t,k denote the gross yield on foreign-currency debt
of the same maturity issued by the benchmark foreign debtor, typically a
risk-free instrument issued by the British Treasury at the same market. Let-
ting iA
t,k   ln(Rt,k ∗A) and similarly with the other yields, we can write the fol-
lowing interest-rate equilibrium conditions:
(1) it,k
A∗   if∗
t,k    t
(2) ip∗
t,k   if∗
t,k    t
(3) it,k
M∗   if∗
t,k   εt
where  t    (if∗
t,k; it,k
A∗; LA);  t and εt are the national, provincial, and mu-
nicipal pure default or simply entity risk premia, respectively. In line with
our assumptions, it should be clear that:  t    t    p and εt    t    p  
 M, being  p,  Mthe speciﬁc province and municipal premia over (and typ-
ically above) the national government default premium. Therefore, it is
straightforward that  Pt    P(it,k
A∗; it,k
P∗; LP);  Mt    M(it,k
P∗; it,k
M∗; LM). The
equilibrium of interest rates of the sovereign and diﬀerent subsovereign
bodies as shown in equations (1), (2), and (3) can be rewritten as follows:
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A∗   if∗
t,k    t
(2 ) it,k
P∗   if∗
t,k    t    Pt
(3 ) it,k
M∗   if∗
t,k    t    Pt    Mt
The relevant spreads are obtained as:
(4) RA   it,k
A∗   if∗
t,kt    t
(5) RP   it,k
P∗   if∗
t,k    t    Pt
(6) RM   it,k
M∗   if∗
t,k    t    Pt    Mt
Equations (4) to (6) reveal a cascade eﬀect in the determination of each risk
premium. Furthermore, recalling that
(7) LTOT   L A   LP   LM,
where all borrowings are expressed at present values, it turns out that the
total country risk premium is
(8) RT    A t    PRP    MRM, as laid out in section 5.3.1.
As a special case we might have that when  P   0 and  M   0 (as 1890–
91 proves) RT    t. Certainly, this is not the case when international liq-
uidity abounds and market sentiment improves, as in the earlier period.
The exception would be the case of a federal country where subsovereign
entities are ﬁscally independent, perceived as solvent as the federal state
and there are no moral hazard problems. In this case, assuming that  P  
0,  M   0, both  p,  M would be zero and again RT    t.
Based on this framework, we now aim to: (a) compute the true measure
of country risk, RT t, and (b) compare it to  t. Section 5.4 presents the data
set and an estimate of RT.
5.4 Preliminary Evidence on the True Measure of Country Risk
5.4.1 Data Set
We work with bimonthly data from The Economist newspaper, covering
the period January 1886–January 1892. More speciﬁcally, we collect cur-
rent market (bid) price observations corresponding to foreign and colonial
stocks, namely the Argentine Republic, provincial entities, and munici-
palities. Besides the sovereign bond prices, which are easy to identify and
are traded on a liquid market, we should ideally include all twenty-three
provincial and municipal loans as reported by Shepherd (1933, table 6).
Unfortunately, this is not possible because (a) The Economist does not re-
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quoted on an irregular basis (i.e., illiquidity) or (c) secondary market data
is not available for a speciﬁc loan at all times. Thus, we try to ﬁnd loans
with the closest issue date, coupon payments, and maturity, when possible.
Table 5.2 summarizes the national, provincial, and municipal bonds we
have selected, as well as their main features.
5.4.2 The True Measure of Country Risk: Some Preliminary Estimates
In a ﬁrst step, we proceed to compute  t, RP , and RM so as to be able to
compute the true measure of country risk, RT. To this end, we ﬁrst calcu-
late a current yield for each loan at a given date as the ratio coupon-to-bid
price. This current yield is a rough proxy of the bond yield to maturity.
Coupon bond (clean) prices should indeed reﬂect the relationship between
the coupon rate and the yield to maturity: when the former is higher than
the yield to maturity the price should be above par (i.e., higher than 100)
and vice versa. As we are unable to retrieve the yield to maturity for each
bond, we assume they are equal to the bond’s current yield.
Most of these bonds had maturities of about thirty years. We recall that
we are calculating a pure default premium, as all loans are ﬂoated and traded
in the same jurisdiction (London) and are denominated in the same currency,
that is, sterling. Then,  t, RP , RM are obtained by subtracting each current
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8. We were unable to ﬁnd the unquoted loan prices in other sources such as www.global
ﬁn.com or The Corporation of Bond Holders, at least on a regular and high-frequency basis.
Table 5.2 Loan features: Sovereign and sub-sovereign issuers
Original 
amount 
Denomination placed  Issue  Coupon 
Agent Entity and issue date (sterling) price payments
Baring Bros. Argentine Republic 5% loan, 1884 1.714.200 84a,b semi-annual
Baring Bros. Province of Buenos  6% loan, 4.098.300 92 and 98 quarterlya
Aires 1882–1886
Morton, Rose  Province of Cordoba 6% loan,  1.190.400 91 and 92 semi-annual
& Co. 1887–1888
Murrieta & Co. Province of Entre  6% loan, 1886 800.000 91a,b semi-annual
Rios
Morton, Rose  Province of Santa Fe 6% loan,  1.434.426 90 and 86a,b semi-annual
& Co. 1883–1884
Heinemann  City of Rosario 6% loan, 1888 992.000 103 semi-annual
& Co.
Source: The Economist, January 1886–January 1892.
aAll loans contained an accumulative sinking fund provision of 1 percent over the principal.
bAdmittedly there will be an unaccounted “coupon size and payout frequency” eﬀect on the yield dif-
ferential of Buenos Aires.yield from the current yield of a risk-free bond, namely British Consols per-
petuities of 3 percent or 3.5 percent, depending on the year. In the case of
RP, we calculate a weighted average of the four provincial current yields cor-
responding to those loans reported in table 5.2 above. The loan weights are
estimated using data from Shepherd (1933) and are shown in table 5.3.
Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 plot  t, RP, RM, and RT, respectively, over the
relevant period and over two subsample periods, namely tranquil times
(1886–89) and turmoil times (1890–92).9
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Table 5.3   per province
Buenos Aires Cordoba Entre Rios Santa Fe Total
Sterling 9,154,686 3,785,600 5,276,400 6,619,526 24,836,212
Share 0.369 0.152 0.212 0.267
Source: Shepherd (1933).
Notes: Based on those provinces for which data are available in The Economist. Adds up all
loans contracted by a province in 1880–1890.
Fig. 5.2 Sovereign and sub-sovereign spreads over British Consol yields 1886–91:
National, provincial, and municipal issuers
9. RT starts from October 1888 due to the constraint imposed by our municipal loan,
Rosario (1888) 6 percent, and the lack of alternative data prior to this year.Fig. 5.3 Sovereign and sub-sovereign spreads over British Consol yields II 1886–89:
National, provincial, and municipal issuers; tranquil times
Fig. 5.4 Sovereign and sub-sovereign spreads over British Consol yields III 1890–91:
National, provincial, and municipal issuers; ﬁnancial turmoilFigures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 illustrate several important facts:
1. Until November 1890 provincial and municipal (represented by
Rosario) bonds were traded at an average spread of 100 to 120 basis points
(bps) above the sovereign. In particular, we see that the true measure of
country risk stood close to the sovereign bond spread in tranquil times (ﬁg-
ures 5.2 and 5.3). Put diﬀerently, when liquidity was plentiful investors
were attaching a slightly higher probability of default to subsovereign en-
tities in comparison with the sovereign.
2. All yields start to rise from July–August 1890, when the ﬁrst defaults
are declared (Shepherd 1933), amid political upheaval and deep concerns
about the ﬁnancial health of the diﬀerent entities (ﬁgure 5.4).
3. However, the decoupling between the sovereign and subsovereign
entities’ spreads over the British Consol yield only becomes apparent in
November 1890 (bold dotted line in ﬁgure 5.4), when Baring’s troubles are
known. For instance, the provincial spread over the sovereign yield widens
to 900 bps by June 1891 and never comes down to below 600 bps afterward.
4. Since November 1890 we observe how the yield diﬀerential between
the true measure of country risk (RT) and the representative sovereign
bond (Argentina 1884 [5 percent]) start to increase. Figure 5.5 presents ev-
idence in this direction: RT trades at 200 to 300 bps over the typical sover-
eign risk premium in 1891 (bold solid line, right hand scale). This excess
spread would be wider should one exclude the loan incurred by Rosario,
our representative municipal bond, which may be regarded as a special
bond that traded at tighter than even provincial spread levels.10
5.5 Historical and Political Economy Side: Politics and Debt
The downward bias of the true country risk during tranquil times was of
about 100 to 200 basis points, a magnitude that represents one third of the
absolute value of the spread. It is important to note that the band of diver-
gence is maintained until the late 1890s, but afterward the divergence be-
comes clear even before the defaults of 1892. Hence, one might say that not
only did Argentina start a period of ﬁnancial autarky, but also the oppor-
tunity cost of its staging a comeback to the international capital markets
was higher. This higher cost was not due to the performance of its own fed-
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10. Indeed, one should caution against the use of the bond ﬂoated by Rosario in 1888 as a
municipal benchmark issue. This loan may not be representative of other Argentine munici-
pal bonds, given its speciﬁc features and low discount. On the other hand, as we said earlier,
The Economist does not report bond market prices/yields for all other Argentine municipal
loans entered into in 1886–92, or some reported bonds are quoted on an irregular basis (e.g.,
illiquidity), hence not allowing any expanded calculation of the municipal default risk pre-
mium. Notwithstanding this data availability constraint, our hunch is that other municipal
bonds were at least riskier than national government bonds.eral bonds but to the attribution of solvency involved now in turbulent-
time bonds that originally have had a diﬀerent seniority.
It is apparent from this historical performance that institutions’ subtleties
matter more and more fully appear in harsher rather than in more tranquil
times. It is a surprising but well-known asymmetric result from credit mar-
kets that the spread (and its volatility) between good and lemon assets ﬂat-
tens when markets are hugely liquid and goes nuts when conditions worsen.
While the borrower might have the usual time-inconsistent and moral haz-
ard macroeconomic feature in credit markets, here the creditor has a time-
inconsistent institutional appraisal and enforceability of the diﬀerent ﬁxed-
income instruments. The endgame outcome of whether Argentina had to
bail out subsovereign bonds rests on the bargaining power of the interna-
tional creditors and the cost-beneﬁt perception of the borrowing nation.
What was the strategy followed by Argentina to manage the 1890–91
Baring crises to eventually return to the international capital markets?
First, we must say that the ﬁrst political entity that recognized the ser-
vice payments diﬃculties was the Argentine Republic in July 1890, stating
that it might default on all foreign debt obligations (della Paolera and Tay-
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Fig. 5.5 Excess spread between “True Measure of Country Risk” and typical Sov-
ereign Spread (ARG 84.5%): 1890–91 ﬁnancial turmoillor 2001, 72–73). This announcement produced a cascade eﬀect on the for-
eign obligations of the provinces and municipalities, which by the end of
1891 defaulted both on their interest and amortization payments. The in-
cumbent President Juarez Celman resigned in August 1890 and was re-
placed by his Vice-President Carlos Pellegrini, a well-seasoned cosmopol-
itan politician and ﬁnancier.
The strategy of the Argentine central government was implemented in
two steps: (a) Pellegrini stated ﬁrst that Argentine bonds would and should
never be in default, and quickly produced the famous Funding Loan agree-
ment of 1891 with the Bank of England to avert the full default on the Ar-
gentine bonds; (b) he insisted to the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders
that the situation of the provincial and municipal debt was a separate prob-
lem, and placed it in a diﬀerent jurisdiction. Hence, the Bank of England
acted as a lender of last resort in 1891 to the central Argentine government,
bailing out both the Argentine Republic and Baring.
In the Romero agreement of 1893, the relief on service and amortization
payments still referred to the Argentine republic debt, and the provincial
and municipal debts were in limbo after having quoted in good times only
50 basis points above the best Argentine ﬁxed income security! However, in
1898, Argentina, in a virtual state of autarky, recognized the provincial and
municipal external obligations, which were deﬁnitely consolidated in the
year 1905. That is, in spite of the clearly diﬀerent conditions and collateral
implied by diﬀerent type of bonds, the ex post facto here as in the previous
case of the Baring loan undertaken by the province of Buenos Aires in
1824, the federal government nationalized the whole debt obligations,
which means that in an emerging country in which most of the debt in-
curred in order to ﬁnance expenditure is ﬂoated in hard currency in inter-
national markets, institutional moral hazard is king.
Therefore, the true measure of the opportunity cost of funds for Ar-
gentina and the real cost of the debt burden for the whole citizenry should
take into account this feature. Again, to have concluded that in January
1890, because Argentina’s federal bond yield was converging to the world
yield and hence we were witnessing a more mature capital market, is at best
a partial equilibrium statement. And this is a lesson that was not learned
by economists for the contemporaneous economies. Ex ante sovereign
property right constraints might not be constraints at all after certain
events arise. So both the cost of capital in the buoyant period and the cost
of being in autarky for some many years after the crash should internalize
the true measure of country risk.
5.6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we ask about the importance of the political structure of an
emerging market economy in determining its degree of participation and
The True Measure of Country Risk 209strategies in the international debt markets. We think we have added an-
other angle to the discussion by recognizing that debt strategies depend not
only on political polarization, election probabilities, or standard forward-
looking time inconsistencies; the economic eﬀects of the political structure
of emerging nations are an important consideration in analyzing their eco-
nomic development.
And this political structure eﬀect should be priced accordingly.
In this ﬁrst exercise, we have calculated the true measure of country risk
in light of the Argentine experience of 1886–1892. It was shown that the true
measure decoupled from the typical sovereign risk spread by 200 to 350 ba-
sis points when liquidity crunches and political upheaval set up a tough sce-
nario after July 1890. More importantly, the credit crunch had an eﬀect on
the strategic behavior of both borrowers and lenders in an ex post facto.
The lessons drawn here are very telling to the recent build-up of debt that
drove the surprising collapse of the Argentine currency board and the ﬁ-
nancial system in early 2002, and the public debt disarray.11 Moreover, it
informs policymakers and investors about the correct way of assessing
country risk in federal countries where subsovereign entities are ﬁscally
dependent on the central government ﬁnances and where moral hazard is
present.
For further research, the paper invites political economy researchers to
analyze the actual costs and consequences of ex ante pitfalls in evaluating
country risk when the polity of a country diﬀers. Our ﬁrst prognosis here
is that when a federal republic cannot develop well-integrated capital mar-
kets, it probably means that the polity structure is clearly suboptimal and
fails to eﬀect economic development and progress for its citizens.
Finally, as an extension of the present study, an econometric model will
be performed in order to test (a) the diﬀerent elasticities of  t, RP, and RM
(or each of the implicit bond yields) to a shock in the international liquid-
ity constraint (e.g., a change in L∗ faced by each entity or If ∗) and (b) the
endogenous responses of an entity spread to a change in other domestic
entities spreads; that is, how fast and sensitive is the cascade eﬀect.
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